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Do NGOs Make A Difference?
A  Case Study of Rural Rajasthan
An empirical analysis of  effects of NGO interventions on health and education of women and girls in rural
Rajasthan employs an original micro data set to address criticisms of NGO effectiveness.  Isolating the
effects of the NGO’s programs from personal and household characteristics (caste, religion, income, wealth,
landowning status, family composition and literacy) and from village fixed-effects,  significant positive
effects on women and girls of several indicators of health, knowledge about health, fertility and literacy rates
are found. Substitution effects between governmental and NGO services are minimal. The paper also
evaluates the cost-effectiveness of the NGO programs.
Keywords: Development, Health, Human Capital, Women, Asia, India 
I. Introduction
For years  it has been widely assumed that Non-governmental Organization (NGO) projects
have significant positive effects on poor households in developing nations. However, a number of
recent empirical studies have questioned the claims about effectiveness of NGO intervention in local
communities.    Some of the criticism has addressed the issue of  lack of appropriate evaluation of1
programs,  particularly when it is performed at a distance by donor agencies that may not be sensitive
to local needs.   The lack of evaluation of micro or village level programs often seems to be a result2
of the failure of local NGOs to engage in systematic self-evaluation.   This is particularly unfortunate3
2
since self-evaluation and effectiveness may be inter-twined, particularly when downward
accountability that employs feedback from the program recipients both empowers them and
improves the program.4
Many of these critiques have focused on programs for broad poverty alleviation or economic
growth rather than on more targeted goals, such as improving female health or educational 
attainment.  The latter are particularly important in parts of the world such as rural Rajasthan where
there is widespread discrimination against women and girl children.  Improving female health and
literacy is widely regarded to be one of the most important means of reducing poverty in India ,  and5
there is evidence that NGOs may have advantages over governments in programs that target health
and education.6
A distinction needs to be drawn, however, between NGOs that work through governments
and  those that operate independently. In both cases whether NGOs are merely providing substitutes
for programs that governments would otherwise supply  is a legitimate concern.  7
This paper examines the effects of a local NGO, the Rajdadiji-Veerni Project, “the NGO”,
that has worked largely independently of the Indian government to promote female health and
literacy in a group of villages near Jodhpur in Western Rajasthan.  This is an area that suffers from8
a lack of attention from the government in New Delhi and which is not well served by large
international NGOs.    At the time of the study, the Veerni Project was operating in 16 villages. Its9
programs included weekly visits from mobile medical clinics, health education classes, and primary
level classes for children in arithmetic and reading conducted in each village.  There were virtually
no substitution effects between government programs and those of the NGO,  since no government
schools or health centers were in operation in any of the villages.  Most girls were not allowed by
3
their families to go outside their own village for schooling in this very socially conservative region
and most women could not afford medical services that were not locally available.
To assess the effects of the Veerni Project (Veerni means “empowerment” in Hindi) an
original data set  was constructed by means of a household survey in nine villages, distinguished
from each other by degree of NGO intervention. Three villages in the sample had no help from the
Veerni Project, three had had programs for 2-3 years, and three had received help from the NGO for
6-10 years at the time of the survey.  The random samples of adult women and of adolescent girls
provide a rich data source that includes information about personal and family socio-economic
characteristics, education  levels, and detailed  medical information for each respondent.  This
permits analysis  which isolates the net effects of the NGO interventions. 
Two questions need to be answered in studying NGO effectiveness, the second conditional
on the outcome of the first. (1) Is there evidence that the NGO has brought about significant changes
in the well-being of the treated population? And, if so (2) What is the cost and the resulting cost-
effectiveness of the NGO programs?  This study finds significant positive effects of the NGO
programs on some measures of health and knowledge about health for both adult women and
adolescent girls, and positive effects on the literacy of adolescent girls.  Consequently, the issue of
the cost effectiveness of the programs will also be addressed in the second part of this paper. 
II. The Analysis
A. The Research Design
The aim of the research  is to isolate the effects of the Veerni Project on the well being
of women and girls, controlling for a vector of personal characteristics (including age, birth-
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order, marital status,  reproductive history) family characteristics (income, wealth, caste, religion,
 education levels of  other family members, family composition, number of male and female
 children or siblings) and environment (village fixed effects).
In the underlying model, standard assumptions are made about the household’s utility
functions, e.g. that utility is increased when wives and daughters are healthier, and that utility is
derived from services provided by wives or daughters. Utility functions are permitted to be
either unitary or cooperative.   Since these are households in rural farming villages, the most
appropriate model is a household-farm model.   In this type of mode the household is assumed to10
 make interdependent decisions about production, labor allocation, and consumption.  The main
 difference from “urban” household models is that the household’s budget is treated as 
endogenous, since it depends upon production decisions that affect income from farming. 11
Although this leads to potentially serious  problems in an econometric analysis that treats
 allocation of resources to education and health as dependent upon a set of exogenous variables,
the cross-sectional analysis in this paper assumes simplified underlying objective functions
in which production decisions are made in time periods preceding consumption decisions.
The budget constraints include cash income, time inputs of family members, and endowments
 of productive inputs (chiefly land and farm animals). 
Costs to the household of a member  receiving health care and education can include both
 direct costs and opportunity  costs of time.  The NGO programs involve no direct costs to
 households  because the health care and schooling provided locally require no user fees. Travel time
 to receive services within these small villages is negligible. The most important cost remaining is
 the time  spent by  girls attending school. 
5
Estimating equations are of general form:
   Dependent Variable = f  (NGO effects,  personal characteristics, family characteristics,
   village fixed effects) 
Probit estimating equations  were used when the dependent variable was a dummy (1/0) variable.
Probits are of  general form:
      p(i) =  $(1) + $(2)x(i2) + … + $(k)x(ik) + u(i)
where p (i) is interpreted as the probability of woman or girl (i) having a particular characteristic.
OLS regressions  were estimated for continuous dependent variables  They are of general form:
1 1 k k      Y(i) = a + B X (i)+ .................B X (i) +  :(i) 
 where Y(i)  is the value of woman or girl (i)’s characteristic (such as number of children she has
 born, her BMI, or haematocrit level).
Unfortunately, data were not collected until years after the NGO interventions had
 commenced.  Therefore, the difference in difference methodology can not be employed in this
 study.
B. The Data
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Veerni Project on women’s health, fertility, literacy,
and knowledge about health and disease prevention, a new data set was compiled.  It consists of
stratified random samples of approximately 1000 adult women and approximately 900  adolescent
girls, collected in a subset of nine villages.  Three villages that had experienced   6-10 year (long-12
term)  NGO intervention, three that had benefitted from 2-3 year (short-term)  NGO intervention, and
three that had no Veerni Project intervention were randomly chosen from among the larger sets of
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villages clustered in the region, and individual households within villages were also chosen
randomly.   The same proportion of women and girls (compared to village populations) were13
surveyed in each of the  villages. It is important to note that all women and girls living in Veerni
Villages are eligible to participate in the NGO’s programs, and serious attempts are made to assure
universal access. 
 The villages are  very similar in climate and in socio-economic level.   All are poor farming
villages located in an arid climate with a chronic water shortage.  No pipelines connect the villages
with external water sources, so usable water is limited to what can be collected in local ponds or
nardis.    The data were collected in the Spring of 2004, with the same households reinterviewed in
the Fall of 2005  in order to obtain more information about male literacy, specifically, education
levels of husbands and fathers.
Separate samples were constructed for adult females (over age 18) and for adolescent girls
(10-18 years of age).  Information was obtained from personal interviews, health histories, and
medical examinations conducted at the time of the interviews.  Professional medical laboratory
analysis of the blood work was used to obtain the haemaglobin and haematocrit levels.  For the
adolescent girls, all respondents are either eldest or only daughters in a family. This should provide
a lower bound estimate of access to schooling since eldest daughters are the least likely to be allowed
to go to school, given their usefulness in caring for younger siblings and in farm and house work.
This study can be described as “quasi-experimental”.  Although the existence of a group of
similar villages that differ primarily by degree of  NGO intervention provides something akin to a
natural experiment, there may be some degree of selection bias in how villages became or did not
become part of the Veerni Project.  In the early 1990s, a group of villages with a high level of need
7
were identified and the Project was initiated.  Over time as more money was raised, villages were
added, partly on the basis of convenience of location, since the mobile medical unit and social
workers visit several villages in the same day in order to provide weekly contact in each of the 16
Veerni villages.  The large number of control variables  used in the estimating equations should,
however, adjust for any differences in factors that might be correlated with extent of NGO assistance.
Village fixed effects are also included.  
  In 2004, at the time of the main data collection, there were no observable significant
differences among the three sets of villages with respect to average monthly household incomes,
family size, number of sons per family, literacy rates of adult women,  or proportion of villagers who
were members of the two lowest castes (dalit and scheduled tribal).  There was a slightly higher
proportion of land owning families in the control villages that had  not received NGO help.     The14
following table of descriptive statistics gives a picture of the socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of the girls and women in the villages.
C. The Variables
The following variables were used in the emplirical analysis.
1. Village fixed-effects: Dummy variables  identify  village of residence.  Eight (n-1) variables
are included in the estimating equations.
2.  Veerni (NGO) fixed-effects: Three dummy variables are used to measure the effect of the
Veerni Project: No Veerni presence, long-term presence, and short-term presence of the Veerni
project. In most estimating equations, the base category is “No Veerni Presence” and attempts are
made to distinguish between the effects of both longer and shorter-run NGO intervention. 
8
3. Social status: Four dummy  variables  measure effects of caste and  religion: Each of the
three lower castes (scheduled castes, dalit; scheduled tribal; and  other backward castes, OBC) and
Muslim religion were singled out for comparison with  general caste and Hindu religion.
Interaction terms between low caste and NGO presence, long- and short-run are also used in
some specifications.  ‘NGOLcaste’ is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a girl is both a
member of one of the designated lower castes and lives in a village which has had long-term Veerni
Project help.  ‘NGO1Lcaste’ takes a value of 1 if she lives in a village which has had Veerni Project
intervention for 2-3 years and  is a member of a lower caste. 
4. Economics status:  Several  variables are used to measure income and wealth. Head-of-
family monthly income ( in rupees)  is used to approximate household income,  and the presence15
of electricity in the home is used as an indirect measure of wealth.  (For some tests, where access to
information was thought to be an important determinant of behavior, an additional variable “has
radio/TV” is included.) A measure of total wealth was constructed by summing  the value of farm
land owned and  the value of farm animals owned by the household, each valued at its market price
in a given village.   
5. Household characteristics:  Family size and/or number of children in a family are used to
adjust family income for the number of people sharing the budget and also as an indicator of the cost
to the family of a daughter’s  time spent in school. Both family size and number of children were used
in some estimating equations  since many of these households consist of multi-generational and/or
joint families. Effects of number of sisters and number of brothers were considered separately when
adolescent girls were studied. 
6.Human Capital Variables:   Literate/illiterate  was used, since many of the girls and women
9
had not  received formal schooling other than the NGO sponsored classes and the majority had not
gone beyond primary education.  Literacy  is  measured by a dummy variable, coded “1" if literate.
For the adolescent girls, both own-literacy and  mother’s and father’s literacy status were used. For
the adult women, husband’s literacy was also considered.
Knowledge about health  was measured by a yes/no variable, ‘knows how HIV/AIDS is
transmitted’. This can be interpreted as “probability that an individual had such knowledge.”  This
variable was used as an indicator of sophistication about health and disease since all  health education
classes for both women and girls included information about transmission of HIV, a disease that is
unfortunately becoming less uncommon in these remote villages.
 7.  Marital status: For adult women, the status ‘married’ is distinguished from single,
 widowed, or divorced. For  adolescent girls, married, effectively married, and unmarried are
 distinguished in the data. An effectively married  girl is one who has had  a marriage ceremony and
 gone to live in the home  of her husband’s family.  ‘ Married’  includes being betrothed and being
 effectively  married.
III. The Findings
(A)  Effect of NGO Intervention on Fertility of Adult Women
The presence of the Veerni Project, both long- and short-run, was associated with lower fertility. 
Significant negative effects on number of children ever born to a woman and number of living children,
were observed when the  NGO effect was isolated from environmental (village) effects, family socio-
economic status, and personal characteristics. [Tables 2a and 2b]
               The net effect of  long-term intervention from the Veerni Project, whose medical team
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 provides information about fertility control and about clinics that offer voluntary sterilization, was  
 a reduction in  average  number of children born to a woman of approximately 1.43. In villages
 where the Project had operated its  health clinics for only two or three years,  its presence was
 associated with a reduction of 1.76 in average number of children born to a woman. The long- and
 short term effects of the Veerni Project on number of living children were  reductions of 0 .93 and 1.26
 respectively.  The larger effect in villages where the Veerni presence  was of shorter duration (due to
 later adoption of the village) probably reflects an unmeasured quality improvement in sterilization
 methods over time.    The mortality and infection rates from hysterectomy (still the most common form
 of sterilization) have fallen; this is likely to have resulted in a decline in resistance to using this form
 of fertility control.   
               (B) NGO Effect on Infant Mortality Rates
   No statistically significant effects of the Veerni Project on male and female infant mortality rates
  were  found when number of children born to a woman was included as a control variable. Since the
  number of children ever born to a woman and number of infant deaths per woman were the only 
  reliable fertility information available  in a setting where birth records are only informally kept and
 the  sense of time is often very inexact,  the fertile life-span of many women in the sample preceded 
 the  presence of the NGO.  Moreover, although age is included as an explanatory variable, there still is
 likely to be a time trend in the infant mortality rates that has not been fully adjusted for. It is therefore
 entirely possible that annual infant mortality rates have declined and that there is an NGO effect not
 shown in these data. That outcome would be consistent with other studies of NGO health programs in
 rural areas.16
That having been said, the only significant explanatory variables for  male or female infant
11
 mortality rates were number of children ever born to the mother and whether the family owned land.
 Infant mortality rates increase with number of children born to a woman and decrease if the family is
 land-owning.  The constructed measure of family wealth based on value of farm animals and land was
 not found to  be significant, whether a dummy variable for land ownership was included or omitted.
 Thus it appears that it is land ownership and not wealth that contributes to lower infant mortality.
  However, the R  in the estimating equations for infant mortality are very low, so the findings need to2
 be considered with some reservation. 
It  is unusual to find no positive effects of mother’s literacy on infant mortality.   When we17
 examine the data on female anemia levels in these villages it is less surprising.  Seventy-six percent of
 the adolescent girls and 82 percent of the adult women in the samples were found to have some degree
 of anemia, using Indian standards of  anemia thresholds. This is a part of the world in which malnutrition
 is a very great problem, and no amount of schooling or other interventions that do not directly improve
 nutrition of pregnant women and infants are  likely to have much effect on infant mortality rates. The
 observed NGO-related reduction in fertility  can, nonetheless, be viewed as having a positive, though
 indirect, effect on infant mortality.    
 (C) NGO Effects on  Health of Adult Women
(1) Probit analysis was used to examine the effects of the  NGO’s intervention on the
 likelihood of  a woman exhibiting several different anemia symptoms. Results were mixed. For
 instance, if a woman lived in a “Veerni Village” this  was associated with a lower probability of 
weakness but a higher probability of anemia-related vertigo. A negative association was found
 between  probability of a woman exhibiting “any anemia symptoms” and long-term presence of the
 NGO.  However, this result was only significant at an .08 level. [Table 3] 
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 (2) A probit was estimated for the probability that a woman would eat at least two
 meals a day.  There is an 18 percent increase in the likelihood of a woman having two meals a day  if
 she lives in a village that has received long-run help from the NGO. [Table 4]   Since village fixed-
 effects, wealth, income, number of children, both husband and wife’s  literacy, and access to information
 from radio or TV are included as control variables in the estimating equation, this finding suggests  that
 the NGO presence for at least six years may affect a woman’s status in the family, resulting in a different
 distribution of food among family members.
 (D) NGO Effects on Adult Women’s Knowledge about Health
Whether or not she had (correct) knowledge of how HIV is transmitted was used as a proxy variable
for a  woman’s knowledge about health and disease.  The long-term presence of the Veerni Project
was associated with an increase of 43 percent in the likelihood that a woman would know how HIV
 is transmitted. [Table 5] Here, length of NGO presence  appears to be crucial. There was no observed
 improvement in knowledge about how HIV is contracted in villages in which the health education
 classes had been conducted for only two to three years.
(E) NGO Effects on Health of Adolescent Girls. 
For growing children, two measures of health are often used in studies of poor communities in Asia.
One is the subject’s body mass index  (BMI) and  another is whether or not she is anemic.
(1) When a regression was estimated for determinants of BMI in adolescent girls, the
 presence of the NGO was not found to have a significant effect on age-adjusted adolescent girls’ body
 mass  index. 
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(2) When a  probit was estimated for the probability that an adolescent girl would
 exhibit anemia symptoms, the positive effects of the Veerni Project’s health clinics, both long- and
 short-run, were  dramatic.  A girl was 20 percent less likely to be anemic if she lived in a village that had
 received long-term intervention from the Project.  If her village had experienced short-term help, she
 was 13.7 percent less likely to exhibit symptoms of anemia. [Table 6]
(F) NGO Effects  on Adolescent Girls’ Knowledge about Health
A probit was run to estimate the probability that a girl would know how HIV is transmitted. If she lived
  in a village that had received help from the Veerni Project for six to ten years,  the probability that she
 would know how HIV was transmitted was increased by 22 percent. [Table 7]
(G) NGO Effects on Adolescent Girls’ Literacy     
(1) A probit was estimated for the probability that an adolescent girl would be literate.
The long-run presence of the NGO was associated with an increase in the probability that an adolescent
 girl would be literate of 30 percent. The short-run NGO presence was associated with  an increase of
 23.5 percent. [Table 8a]
(2) A second  probit estimation of probability of literacy  included two additional variables:
 interactions between  NGO effects  and being a member of a lower caste. In this estimation, the negative
 marginal effect of being a member of a lower caste is a reduction of 13  percent in the probability of 
 being literate. The marginal effect of both living in a village with long-term NGO intervention and being
 lower caste is an increase of 18.7 percent in the probability of being literate. The long-term NGO effect
by itself is still positive but no longer significant. The coefficient for the interaction term between short-
14
term NGO presence and low-caste status is not significant. However, the short-term NGO effect  was an
 increase in the probability of literacy of 28 percent.  Thus, the main effect of the classes over the longer-
term appears to be the overcoming of caste-based barriers to adolescent girl literacy whereas the shorter-
term intervention improved the chances of a girl becoming literate regardless of her caste, although low-
caste status reduced the magnitude of the positive effect. [Table 8b]
 
IV. Effectiveness and Cost Effectiveness of the Veerni Project.
   This study has found some clear indications of success for the NGO programs.  The medical
 program, including the work of the health educator, is associated with a significant reduction in fertility
 and improvements in some measures of health and  knowledge about disease prevention for both adult
 women and adolescent girls.  Villages with Veerni classes showed much higher literacy rates among
 adolescent girls  and over the longer-term seemed to reduce the negative effects of low caste status on
 achieving literacy.
  But at what cost were these benefits achieved?  The 2006-7 annual budget for the NGO shows an
 expenditure on the medical program for all 16 villages of $10,964 including travel costs, vehicle
 maintenance, and medicines and supplies. This does not include staff salaries or a pro-rated contribution
 to the stipends to the Village Promoters,   which together totaled approximately $14,000.   The total cost18
 of the combined medical and health education programs was thus approximately $25,000 ( or about
 $1600 per village). 19
Although originally set up to provide only reproductive health care, the medical team now treats
15
 any villagers who come with medical problems, including male farm workers who have suffered
 accidents in the fields.  It also arranges transportation to the hospital in Jodhpur for villagers whose
 medical problems are more severe than can be treated in the local clinic.  It is therefore very difficult to
 establish an average  per case expenditure for the medical program and even more difficult to assess the
 separate cost of  the program to improve reproductive health.
The annual expenditure on the literacy  classes for girls was about $15,000 including the teacher
salaries and pro-rated contributions to the Promoter stipends. The annual cost of this program was slightly
 less than $1000 per village. Between 15 and 20 girls attended the classes in each village, making the cost
 of the literacy program conservatively no more than $67 per pupil per annum.
The long term benefits of this $67 per pupil are more than negligible.  Not only have female
 literacy rates increased significantly in the villages, but some of the girls are now going on to finish
 secondary school and some are now undertaking university level work.   One should also factor in the
 well known inter-generational effects of educating women.  Today the NGO no longer needs to bring
 in outside teachers for the primary level classes since villagers have been trained to conduct the classes
 themselves, a good example of sustainable development.
To what extent were the NGO sponsored health care and education programs merely substitutes for
 government services that could have been used by the villagers?  At the time of the study, there were no
 competing government clinics in any of these villages.  Some medical supplies, such as polio vaccine for
 children, can only be legally provided by the Indian government, but as recently as Fall 2000, distribution
 of the vaccine was spotty, at best, and some village children were still recent polio victims.  Due, in part,
16
 to village  activism fostered by the NGO through the Promoters,  the vaccine is now being given to all
 young children in the villages. The Veerni Project medical team monitors this.  This is an example of
 NGO  activity that  is complementary to, not a substitute for, a government program.20
Traditional local healers and  midwives are still widely used by villagers, and the midwives receive
 instruction in sanitary birthing techniques from the NGO medical staff.  The latter thus provides a  service
 complementary with indigenous health workers who preceded and now co-exist with the NGO health
 program.
No government schools were in operation in any of the sample villages.  The combination of
 conservative social values, low incomes, and lack of transportation generally prohibited girls from
 attending primary schools outside their own village.  The Veerni classes were conveniently located and
 held at a time of day when children are most free from farm and household duties.  This is an example of
 the  flexibility which can give  NGOs  a comparative advantage in providing education in a rural setting.
 Today government primary schools are replacing the Veerni classes, and are even employing
graduates of the NGO program  as primary school teachers.   Pressure from local village activist groups
has probably contributed to this recent increase  in government schools located within the Veerni  villages.
Thus, one of the longer-term indirect benefits of the NGO presence is the empowerment of villagers,
which leads them to demand more from the state and national governments.
The Veerni Project has itself evolved in response to its self-evaluation process. Evidence from the
 survey data showed that infant and child mortality rates were not declining in any noticeable way. As a
 result, the Project is now sponsoring a pilot nutrition program in which children aged 0 to 6 years are
17
 receiving locally produced food supplements.  It is hoped that this will not only reduce infant and child
 mortality and morbidity but also provide a “cash crop” for the villagers.  
Notes
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Table 1
                                    Socio-Economic Characteristics of Females in Study Villages
Characteristic Adult women Adolescent Girls
Avg HH Income  Rs (Monthly)  2827 3038
% Households with Electricity  51  44
Avg Number in Household  6.73   7.65
% Households Owning Land  82    86
 Avg No. Sons/Brothers  1.66    2.19 
 Avg No. Daughters/Sisters  1.46    2.57
% Literate  15    75
% Mother Literate    7
% Father Literate    56
 Avg.  Age of Marriage   16.36    2.6*
% Scheduled Castes   18.5    18.6
% Scheduled Tribal    7. 4     8.3
% OBC    41.8     48.6
% Hindu**    95.7      94.1
*Includes betrothed.  65 percent of the adolescent girls in the sample were betrothed before their
first birthday.
**All women and girls in the samples who are not Hindu are Muslim.
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Table 2a
Determinants of Number of Children Ever Born to a Woman
R = 0.46722 
Adjusted R  = 0.45562 
N = 943
Variable                           Coefficient Standartd    E  r  r o  r              t P > | t |
Long-Term NGO -1.43414 0.3965412 -3.62 0.000
Short-Term NGO -1.78482 0.3882773 -4.6 .0.000
Age 0.1927192 0.0082363 23.4 0.000
Low (Dalit) Caste 0.2548415 0.2269434 1.12 0.262
Scheduled Tribes 0.0887693 0.2708895 0.33 0.743
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.1762502 0.1818004 -0.97 0.333
Muslim 0.9612904 0.4076469 2.36 0.019
Age Married -0.1550656 0.0216668 -7.16 0.000
Literate -0.8470861 0.1950519 -4.34 0.000
Husband  Literate 0.0392954 0.1345412 0.29 0.770
Electricity in Home -0.0563853 0.1580952 -0.36 0.721
TV or Radio in Home -0.026823 0.1859036 -0.14 0.885
Monthly Income in Rs. - 6.91e-06 0.0000356 -0.19 0.846
Village 2* -1.230829 0.3676879 -3.35 0.001
Village 3 -0.1404816 0.2979209 0.47 0.637
Village 4* 0.1828299 0.3033618 0.06 0.547
Village 6 -0.139943 0.3774898 -0.37 0.711
Village 7 -2.020098 0.3462615 -5.83 0.000
Village 8 -1.774764 0.3570084 -4.97 0.000
Wealth 2.52e-07 1.21e-07 2.09 0.037
Constant 1.829206 0.6024105 3.04 0.002
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*Villages 1 and 5 dropped because of co-linearity
Table 2b
Determinants of Number of Living Children per Mother
R = 0.45032 
Adjusted R  = 0.43832 
N = 943
Variable                     Coefficient Standardt   E  r  r o  r             t P > | t |
Long-Term NGO -0.9347359 0.3465278 -2.7 0.007
Short-Term NGO -1.2622 0.3393062 -3.72 0.000
Age 0.165371 0.0071975 22.98 0.000
Low (Dalit) Caste  -0.0154181 0.1983204 -0.10 0.938
Scheduled Tribes -0.0164056 0.2367238 -0.10 0.945
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.2151039 0.158871 -1.35 0.176
Muslim 1.011478 0.3562328 2.84 0.005
Age Married -0.119859 0.0189341 -6.33 0.000
Literate -0.7680823 0.1704512 -4.51 0.000
Husband Literate 0.0952999 0.1175723 0.81 0.418
Electricity in Home -0.1201878 0.1381556 -0.87 0.385
TV or Radio in Home -0.0952235 0.1624567 -0.59 0.558
Monthly Income in Rs. 0.000012 0.0000311 0.38 0.701
Village 2* -1.191486 0.3213136 -3.71 0.000
Village 3 -0.2200855 0.2603459 -0.85 0.398
Village 4* 0.2124584 0.2651006 -0.80 0.423
Village 6 -0.0755852 0.3298792 -0.23 0.819
Village 7 -1.162838 0.3025896 -3.84 0.000
Village 8 -1.121167 0.3119811 -3.59 .0000
Wealth 1.69e-07 1.05e-07 1.60 0.109
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Constant 1.148486 0.5264321 2.18 0.029
* Villages 1 and 5 dropped because of co-linearity.
Table 3
Probability of an Adult Woman Exhibiting Anemia Symptoms
Pseudo R = 0.04072 
N = 942
Y = Probability of Exhibiting Anemia Symptoms = 0.58768794
Marginal Effects after Probit
Variable                      dy/dx Standazr d   E  r r  o  r             z P > | z |
Long-Term NGO 0.1899854 0.10897 1.74 0.081
Short-Term NGO -0.0364024 0.12484 -0.29 0.771
Age -0.001353 0.00278 -0.49 0.626
Low (Dalit) Caste 0.0245206 0.06013 0.41 0.683
Scheduled Tribes 0.1977788 0.06188 3.2 0.001
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.0192249 0.0483 -0.4 0.691
Muslim 0.1085018 0.1016 1.07 0.286
Literate -0.0874527 0.05383 -1.62 0.104
Monthly Family Income in Rs - 1.94e-06 0.00001 -0.20 0.838
Electricity in Home -0.003093 0.04267 -0.10 0.942
TV or Radio in Home -0.098438 0.05051 -1.95 0.051
Number of Children Born to Woman 0.0062319 0.00872 0.71 0.475
Husband Literate -0.053628 0.03589 -1.49 0.135
Wealth - 4.36e-08 0.00000 -1.35 0.178
Village 2* -0.4301161 0.07696 -5.59 0.900
Village 3 -0.3145675 0.08219 -3.83 0.000
Village 4 -0.0269728 0.10503 -0.26 0.797
Village 5* -0.0287722 0.10239 -0.28 0.779
Village 7 -0.0775737 0.09882 -0.79 0.432
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Village 8 -0.1302442 0.10139 -1.28 0.199
*Villages 1 and 6 dropped because of co-linearity
Table 4
Probability that an Adult Woman Eats at Least Two Meals a Day
Pseudo R = 0.13412 
N = 942
Y = Probability that Adult Woman Eats Two Meals a Day = 0.08858199
Marginal Effects after Probit
Variable                      dy/dx Standazr d   E  r r  o  r           z P > | z |
Long-Term NGO 0.1834177 0.07705 2.38 0.017
Short-Term NGO 0.0951128 0.08631 1.10 0.270
Age 0.0037581 0.00153 2.45 0.014
Low (Dalit) Caste -0.0299204 0.02683 -1.12 0.265
Scheduled Tribes -0.0832544 0.0166 -5.02 0.000
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.0677165 0.02405 -2.82 0.005
Muslim -0.0546814 0.02924 -1.87 0.061
Literate 0.0522715 0.03559 1.47 0.142
Monthly Income in Rs 1.13e-06 0.00001 0.22 0.822
Electricity in Home -0.003553 0.02368 -0.15 0.881
TV or Radio in Home -0.0207705 0.02477 -0.84 0.402
Number of Children Born to Woman -0.005257 0.00492 -1.07 0.285
Husband Literate -0.009075 0.02048 -0.44 0.658
Wealth    - 1.29e-08 0.0000 -0.73 0.466
Village 1 -0.013776 0.03225 -0.43 0.669
Village 2* -0.070568 0.01679 -4.20 0.000
Village 4 -0.1010209 0.01837 -5.50 0.000
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Village 5 -0.0175147 0.04632 -0.38 0.705
Village 7 -0.0235535 0.05033 -0.47 0.640
Village 8 -0.00257 0.05911 0.00 0.965
*Villages 3 and 6 dropped because of co-linearity
Table 5
Probability that an Adult Woman Knows How HIV is Transmitted
Pseudo R = 0.33962 
N = 942
Y = Probability that an Adult Woman Knows How HIV is Transmitted = 0.18200564
Marginal Effects after Probit
Variable                       dy/dx Standazr d   E  r r  o  r             z P > | z |
Long-Term NGO 0.4307195 0.11521 3.74 0.000
Short-Term NGO 0.157008 0.13808 1.14 0.295
Age -0.00096 0.00245 -0.39 0.695
Low (Dalit) Caste -0.1491486 0.0333 -4.48 0.000
Scheduled Tribes -0.1017853 0.03827 -2.66 0.008
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.1110261 0.03585 -3.10 0.002
Muslim -0.0460166 0.07007 -0.66 0.511
Literate 0.2807294 0.05645 4.97 0.000
Monthly Income in Rs 7.86e-06 0.00001 1.01 0.312
Electricity in Home 0.0608074 0.03654 1.66 0.096
TV or Radio in Home 0.1959155 0.04886 4.01 0.000
Number of Children Born to Woman -0.006157 0.00793 -0.78 0.437
Husband  Literate 0.055661 0.02994 1.86 0.063
Wealth 2.25e-09 0.00000 0.08 0.935
Village 1 -0.004171 0.05597 -0.10 0.941
Village 2* -0.087385 0.03853 -2.27 0.023
Village 4 -0.0415384 0.07769 -0.53 0.593
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Village 5* -0.0666164 0.0685 -0.97 0.331
Village 7 -0.063974 0.0909 -0.7 0.482
Village 8 0.0399642 0.11373 0.35 0.725
*Villages 3 and 6 dropped because of co-linearity
Table 6
Probability that an Adolescent Girl will Exhibit Anemia Symptoms
Pseudo R = 0.10152 
N = 856
Y = Probability of Exhibiting Anemia Symptoms = 0.16114143
Marginal Effects after Probit
Variable                       dy/dx Standazr d   E  r r  o  r             z P > | z |
Long-Term NGO -0.2023789 0.06263 -3.23 0.001
Short-Term NGO -0.1369274 0.07222 -1.09 0.058
Age 0.0181387 0.00526 3.45 0.001
Low (Dalit) Caste 0.0077334 0.04093 0.19 0.750
Scheduled Tribes 0.1081616 0.06126 1.77 0.077
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.0672218 0.03445 -1.95 0.051
Muslim -0.1247585 0.04193 -2.98 0.003
Effective Marriage -0.0311378 0.02840 -1.10 0.273
Literate -0.0650699 0.03407 -1.91 0.056
Monthly Family Income in Rs - 7.47e-06 0.00001 -0.90 0.366
Mother Literate -0.0694824 0.04256 -1.63 0.103
Father Literate -0.0483844 0.02838 -1.70 0.088
TV or Radio in Home -0.028962 0.0322 -0.90 0.368
Number of Brothers 0.0046587 0.01217 0.38 0.702
Number of Sisters 0.0075722 0.00887 0.85 0.393
Owns Land -0.0188242 0.06684 -0.28 0.778
Wealth 9.41e-09 0.00000 0.30 0.764
Village 1* 0.2557576 0.10189 2.51 0.012
Village 3 0.0813746 0.06354 1.28 0.200
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Village 4 -0.0791423 0.06315 -1.25 0.210
Village 5* -0.080706 0.05907 -1.37 0.172
Village 7 -0.1340157 0.04610 -2.91 0.004
Village 8 -0.1542633 0.03441 -4.48 0.000
   *Villages 2 and 6 dropped because of co-linearity
Table 7
Probability that a Girl Knows How HIV is Transmitted
Pseudo R = 0.41572 
N = 851
Y = Probability that Girl Knows How HIV is Transmitted = 0.07715137
Marginal Effects after Probit
Variable                        dy/dx Standazr d    E   r r o  r            z P > | z |
Long-Term NGO 0.22043 0.10518 2.10 0.036
Short-Term NGO -0.0123055 0.07465 -0.20 0.869
Age 0.0283867 0.00422 6.72 0.000
Low (Dalit) Caste -0.0893202 0.01778 -5.00 0.000
Scheduled Tribes 0.0152425 0.04026 0.38 0.705
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.0723339 0.02523 -2.9 0.004
Muslim -0.0299094 0.06949 -0.4 0.667
Married 0.0183932 0.02291 0.8 0.422
Literate 0.0830223 0.0179 4.64 0.00
Monthly Income 3.89e-06 0.0000 0.84 0.400
Number of Brothers 0.0042463 0.00898 0.47 0.636
Number of Sisters -0.00059 0.00658 0.00 0.929
Mother Literate 0.0437452 0.04274 1.02 0.306
Electricity in Home 0.069913 0.02389 2.93 0.003
TV or Radio in Home 0.1212413 0.03524 3.44 0.001
Father Literate 0.0209053 0.02067 1.01 0.312
Wealth - 1.44e-08 0.00000 -0.65 0.517
Village 2* -0.0351904 0.02747 -1.30 0.200
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Village 3 0.005844 0.03459 0.17 0.866
Village 4* 0.0214194 0.07236 0.30 0.767
Village 7 0.0679008 0.09867 0.69 0.491
Village 8 0.0446706 0.08924 0.5 0.617
*Villages 1, 5, and 6 dropped because of co-linearity
Table 8a
Probability of an Adolescent Girl Being Literate
Pseudo R = 0.20862 
N = 856
Y = Probability of Being Literate = 0.79750706
Marginal Effects after Probit
Variable                        dy/dx Standazr d    E   r r o  r            z P > | z |
Long-Term NGO 0.3036476 0.07463 4.07 0.000
Short-Term NGO 0.2352465 0.07995 2.94 0.003
Age  -0.0474663 0.00586 -8.1 0.000
Low (Dalit) Caste -0.0415263 0.05258 -0.79 0.430
Scheduled Tribes -0.1910097 0.07577 -2.52 0.012
Other Backwards Castes (OBC) -0.0146969 0.04245 -0.35 0.729
Muslim -0.3643326 0.15554 -2.34 0.019
Effective Marriage -0.0411165 0.03364 -1.22 0.222
Monthly Income in Rs 0.0000196 0.00001 2.00 0.045
Number of Brothers -0.0199592 0.1347 -1.48 0.138
Number of Sisters -0.0106958 0.01025 -1.04 0.297
Mother Literate 0.1272416 0.04496 2.83 0.005
Electricity in Home 0.1216753 0.03737 3.26 0.001
TV or Radio in Home 0.0688541 0.04013 1.72 0.086
Father Literate 0.0470558 0.03192 1.47 0.140
Wealth - 1.75e-09 0.00000 -0.10 0.979
Village 1* -0.1031514 0.11348 -0.91 0.363
Village 3 -0.2707392 0.09062 -2.99 0.003
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Village 4 0.0106421 0.1028 0.1 0.918
Village 5* -0.2030389 0.12902 -1.57 0.116
Village 7 0.0555227 0.08238 0.67 0.500
Village 8 0.1126477 0.06523 1.73 0.084
   Villages 2 and 6 dropped because of co-linearity.
Table 8b
Probability of an Adolescent Girl Being Literate
 (with interaction terms for NGO and Low Caste)**
Pseudo R = 0.20322 
N = 856
Y = Probability of Being Literate = 0.78292056
Marginal Effects after Probit
Variable                        dy/dx Standazr d    E   r r o  r            z P > | z |
Long-Term NGO 0.1748924 0.10377 1.69 0.092
Short-Term NGO 0.2811462 0.08857 3.17 0.002
Age -0.1669903 0.02056 -8.12 0.000
Low Caste** -0.1305502 0.05996 -2.18 0.029
Low Caste * Long-Term NGO 0.1843711 0.06021 3.06 0.002
Low Caste * Short-Term NGO -0.0459006 0.14001 -0.33 0.743
Muslim -0.4565599 0.15295 -2.99 0.003
Effective Marriage Status -0.0998265 0.04300 -2.91 0.004
Monthly Family Income in Rs 0.0000205 0.00001 2.15 0.032
Number of Brothers -0.0344627 0.01328 -2.6 0.009
Number of Sisters -0.0131671 0.01023 -1.29 0.198
Mother Literate 0.0838095 0.05774  1.45 0.147
Electricity in Home 0.0945981 0.0369 2.56 0.010
TV or Radio in Home 0.0773911 0.04024 1.92 0.054
Father Literate 0.0504716 0.03218 1.57 0.117
Wealth - 2.39e-08 0.00000 -0.68 0.494
Village 1* -0.0937484 0.10996 -0.85 0.394
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Village 3 -0.2492967 0.08707 -2.86 0.004
Village 4 0.0420754 0.09833 0.43 0.669
Village 5* -0.1388433 0.12537 -1.11 0.268
Village 7 0.1252387 0.07102 1.76 0.078
Village 8 0.1651534 0.05513 3.00 0.003
 *Villages 2 and 6 dropped because of co-linearity
  ** Low Caste = scheduled caste (dalit),  scheduled tribal, or OBC
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